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NOTES
RETAIL REGULATION UNDER THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT AS
AN EXERCISE OF THE FEDERAL POWER OVER INTERSTATE CoMMERCE-The justification of any legal system must ultimately rest upon the service it renders to the
society that tolerates it. In order to maintain that service, the change inevitable
in all social relationships demands a law responsive to new conditions so that from
chaos and maladjustment may come order and harmony. It would seem, therefore, that the value to society as law of a written constitution such as that of the
United States depends largely upon its capacity and the ability of those that
interpret it to meet the novel requirements of a nation daily increasing in social
complexity and economic interdependence. As the Supreme Court has said,
"Constitutional provisions do not change but their operation extends to
new matters as the modes of business and the habits of life of the people
vary with each succeeding generation." I
Clearly, the federal power over interstate commerce must include more and more
of the activities within a state as the modem facilities of transportation and
communication and the development of mass production and distribution create a
national, commercial unity hitherto impossible. A once local practice may by the
nation's growth acquire a nation-wide significance and be subject to federal
control.2
It is in this light that we must approach the National Industrial Recovery
Act and the regulation of retail practices in the codes.3 The problem of the
validity of such regulation has become acute. Recently, two Federal District
Court judges in cases before them involving the Petroleum Code of Fair Competition adopted the view that gasoline filling stations were intrastate activities
essentially "local" in nature, and that, therefore, the federal government could
neither force upon them standards of wages and hours of labor,4 nor prevent
their use of premiums to sell gasoline., Although the situation is without precedent, it is submitted that there is no lack of authority to illustrate that the conUIn re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 591, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 909 (1895). This passage was quoted
in sustaining the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 48 STAT. 31, U. S. C. A. (Special Pamphlet
No. 4, July, 1933) 83, in United States v. Calistan Packers, Inc., U. S. L. W.. Nov. 1O,
1933, at 86 (N. D. Cal., 1933).
2Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 315, 321 (1934);
Dickinson, The Major Issues Presented by the Industrial Recovery Act (933) 33 Cor. L.
REv. 1O95, IIOI; Bikl6, Commerce Power and Hammer v. Dagenhart (1919) 67 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 21, 35.
5

It is not within the scope of this note to consider the validity of regulations of manufacture and production. This problem is considered in Note (933) 47 HARV. L. Rlv. 85,
go; Note (1934) 43 YAix L. J. 61o; Note (1934) 28 ILT. L. REv. 936. See also Marshall
and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production (1933) 42 YAIE L. J. 7o2. A
significant recent case holding invalid the Code regulation of petroleum production is
Amazon Petroleum Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, U. S. L. W., Feb. 20, 1934, at 520
(E. D. Tex.).
6 United States v. Lieto, U. S. L. W., Feb. 27, 1934, at 535 (N. D. Tex.), a prosecution
under Sec. 3 (f), tit. i, of the N. I. R. A.
GUnited States v. Suburban Motor Service Corp., U. S. L. W., Feb. 20, 1934, at 519
(N. D. Ill.), an action to enjoin the violation of Rules 2 and 17, art. v of the Petroleum Code
of Fair Competition. It is significant to notice that the court specifically refused to decide
the case on the basis that the Code violated "due process" of law because of the case of Home
B. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 54 Sup. Ct. 231 (1934). It also refused to hold that there had
been an unlawful delegation of legislative power because of the lack of authority to support
the proposition. See Note (934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 739.
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clusion reached in these cases is unnecessary. In considering such authority, the
question logically resolves itself into two considerations: first, the extent of
federal power-what persons or practices are subject to it-and second, the nature
or quality of the power.6
In considering the extent of federal power, it is of little purpose to establish
a concept of "interstate commerce" and to assume, thereby, to limit the exercise
of the federal power to that which falls within the definition. It has long been
the law, and is now relied upon by the N. I. R. A., 7 that the power includes the
much broader field of activity which, though not a part of, does "affect" interstate
commerce. 8 Realizing, however, that in fact everything has some effect upon
commerce, the Supreme Court has tried to define what may be included by conceiving of commerce as a stream flowing from producer to consumer which
depends essentially upon certain "local" processes that because of such dependence are subject to federal regulation.' It is obvious, as a practical matter, that
nothing is more essential to the interstate shipment of commodities than the retail
sale toward which not only the actual transportation but the entire productive
industry is directed. Moreover, as a matter of law, the courts have already recognized this close relationship in interpreting the federal commerce power.
For example, in applying the Shernun Ant-Trust Act' 0 to defendants who
through the boycott of the retailers of certain goods had reduced the commerce
in such goods, the Court said,
"Nor can the Act in question be held inapplicable because the defendants
were not themselves engaged in interstate commerce. The Act made no
distinction between classes. It provided that 'every' contract . . . in re[and] the fact that the means operated at
straint of trade was illegal .
one end . . . after the physical transportation ended was immaterial." "1
This principle was later applied to condemn a conspiracy to prevent the installation of telephone exchanges in Illinois because such action would prevent the
shipment of the exchanges into the state.'2 Under this same statute, retailers
6
Gordon, The Child Labor Law Cae (1918) 32 HARV. L. REV. 45, criticising Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (i18), for the failure to make this distinction.
A possible third problem, not considered here, is whether the code provisions violate "due
process" of law. In view of the Home B. & L. case, supra note 5, and People v. Nebbia,

U. S. L. W., March 6, 1934, at 551, decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, it becomes
increasingly unlikely that the Supreme Court will narrowly apply the Fifth Amendment.
See Note (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 61g.
7Tit. I §§3 (b), 3 (f), 4 (a), 4 (b), 9 (c) are all carefully worded to limit the enforcing provisions to matters "in or affecting" interstate commerce. Department of Commerce, Supplement to Bulletin No. 3, C. C. H. Inc., Federal Trade Regulation Service
1983, f9oI.o4, indicates the administration's reliance upon the famous case of
(934)
Houston, Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 343, 34 Sup. Ct. 833 (1914).
1 GAvrr, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1932) § 59; Note (933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 729, 738.
"Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436 (1904);
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (io5); Wilson v. New, 243
(standard of wages held to be prerequisite to uninterrupted
U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (917)
flow of interstate commerce); United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199, 39 Sup. Ct. 445
(191g); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 387 (1922); Chicago Board of
Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1. 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1923).
'26 STAT. 209 (890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ i-4o (927).
Although part of
'Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 301, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 309 (907).
the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 17 (I927), preserves to labor the
right to strike, labor may in other respects still be guilty of unlawful restraint of commerce.
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (292); cf. Gompers v.
Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492 (292o); Vandell v. United States,
6 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
'Boyle v. United States, 259 Fed. 803 (C. C. A. 7th, 2929). But see Industrial Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U. S. 564, 45 Sup. Ct. 403 (2925).
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themselves cannot combine if such combination reduces the natural competition
between them, 13 nor can they bind themselves to sell at a fixed price.' 4 One of
the most recent cases illustrative of the principle involved was the government's
successful prosecution of a monopoly by teamsters that controlled the handling,
sales and prices involved in transporting goods from New York wholesalers to
retailers.' 5 Here once again the Supreme Court admitted that interstate commerce had ended but not the federal power to protect it from intrastate control
that impaired its uninterrupted flow.
In further tracing the extent of federal power over commerce, the activities
of the Federal Trade Commission 6 become especially important because of the
N. I. R. A.'s direct reliance upon it to enforce code provisions against unfair
competitive practices.' 7 Some decisions, possibly due to the early reluctance to
rely upon the new administrative agency,18 have strictly confined the Commission
to practices "in" interstate commerce, avoiding the broader question of whether
19
they adversely affected it.
Thus, in one case, the first sale by the defendant
after he carried the goods across the state boundary was held to be one not "in"
interstate commerce because the state might have taxed the privilege of selling."
It seems clear that the conclusion that the Commission's power depends upon that
of the state to tax is unsound.2 1
Moreover, the courts have fully recognized that the federal power to restrain
unfair practices includes those intrastate activities that adversely affect interstate
commerce.2 2 Thus, the Commission's jurisdiction extends to the practice of
renting equipment to retailers 23 and to agreements fixing the retail price.2 4
Although in these cases the unlawful restraint upon commerce arising from the
limitations imposed upon the retailer by his own contracts are removed by action
against the other party, usually a producer or distributer, there seems to be only
the practical reason against taking
separate and, therefore, more numerous actions
25
against the retailers themselves.

' Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo,
Ct. 951 (1914); cf. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 24 Sup. Ct. 309
Lawlor v. Lowe, 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915).
'Beechnut Packing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 257 U. S.441, 42 Sup.
(ig2z); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup.

34 Sup.
(1904);
Ct. 150
Ct. 376

(I9II).
Local 167 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. United States, 54 Sup.
Ct. 396
1"38 (1934).
STAT.719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §45 (1927).
"N. I. R. A., tit. 1,§ 3 (b), "After the President shall have approved any such code,
the provisions of such code shall be the standards of fair competition for such trade or
industry or subdivision thereof. Any violation of such standards in any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be deemed an unfair method of competition in
commerce within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act . . ."
'DicxiNsoN,

ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927)

c. viii;

Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 599.

"Winslow v. Federal Trade Commission, 277 Fed. 2o6 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921), certiorari
denied, 258 U. S. 618, 42 Sup. Ct. 271 (1922); Canfield Oil Co. v. Commission, 274 Fed. 571
(C. C. A. 6th, 1921), aff'd, on ground that practice was not unfair, 261 U. S. 463, 43 Sup.
Ct. 450 (1923) ; Quincy Oil Co. v. Sylvester, 238 Mass. 95, 13o N. E. 217 (192).
'Ward
Baking Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 264 Fed. 330 (C. C. A. 2d, 192o).
=Conceivably, th& state might tax even though the first sale is part of the commerce
and subject to federal control. License Cases, 5 How. 504 (U. S. 1847).
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 13 F. (2d) 673
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926), relying upon Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, supra note 9. Unfair
practices in manufacture also are included. Nat'l Harness Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Commission, 268 Fed. 7o5 (C. C. A. 6th, 192o).
"3Standard Oil Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 282 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922),
aff'd, 261 U. S.463, 43 Sup. Ct. 450 (1922).
-1Q. R. S. Music Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 12 F. (2d) 73o (C. C. A. 7th,
1926); Moir v. Federal Trade Commission, 12 F. (2d) 2 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
5Cf. Hills Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F. (2d) 481, 484 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
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It is surely conservative, therefore, to conclude that retailing, obviously so
in fact, has in law been recognized as one of those activities that so affect the free
flow of goods in interstate commerce as to be subject to the federal power to
regulate. The nature and quality of this power and the forms in which it may
be exercised are next to be considered.
To discuss de novo the great constitutional problem of whether the federal
commerce power is, but for the Fifth Amendment, absolute or whether it depends
upon the social purpose of Congress not encroaching upon powers reserved to
the states, would be only to do badly what has been done so well before. Citation
must suffice.2 6 The now perhaps infamous case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,27 so
long criticised, has already been distinguished from regulations involved in the
N. I. R. A. 2s However, to follow this method of approach is unnecessary to this
discussion; a simple but none the less adequate support for the program for
national recovery is believed
to be found in the Anti-Trust and Federal Trade
29
Commission statutes.

By the former Congress attempted to protect interstate commerce, and so
the public welfare, by enforcing an economic system of competition; today, suffering from "cut-throat" competitive practices that have destroyed retail and
productive establishments, the nation through Congress seeks to protect interstate commerce and so the public from the evils and excesses of a past era. The
modern program has been well said to rest
..
. on the view, which is embodied in our entire legal system, that
competition cannot be totally unrestrained but must be regulated by the elimination of certain forms. One form of competition the Act stamps especially
with disfavor, namely, competition through lowering the standards of hours,
wages and working conditions of employees below the point compatible with
a decent living." 50
Surely the power to enforce competition includes and is no more important 2 '
than the power to restrain its destructive tendencies.
Finally, there remains to be considered the power of the Federal Trade Commission to restrain unfair competitive practices in interstate commerce. The
- Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 477; Gordon,
supra note 6; Bikl6, supra note 2. The federal government may bar from interstate commerce goods not in themselves harmful or "illicit". Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United
States, 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1918) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 2zr
U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911).
' Supra note 6; the decision was five to four.
' The arguments seem to be that (I) the economic depression increases the effect of
hours of labor upon interstate commerce, and (2) that the Recovery Act is more closely
connected with commerce in that it attempts to increase it by economic rehabilitation.
Note (1933) 47 HAxv. L. Ray. 85, 88; Note (934) 43 YALE L. J. 6Io, 614. Certain provisions of the N. I. R. A., such as Sec. 9 (c), tit. I, prohibiting interstate transportation of
oil produced in violation of a state law would seem to be valid within the rule of Brooks v.
United States, 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345 (1924). The cases so far are not in accord:
Southport Petroleum Co. v. Ickes, 41 Wash. 577 (1933) ; Amazon Petroleum Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Texas, supra note 3.
Supra notes 16 and IO.
=0Dickinson, supra note 2, at lO96. Note the disastrous results from unrestrained competition as alleged by the government in United States v. Suburban Motor Service, Inc.,
supra note 5.
' The nature and size of the interest to be protected is probably an influential factor.
Wahrenbrock, Federal Anti-Trust Law and the National Industrial Recovery Act (1933)
37 MicH. L. Rav. 1009, 1053 n. 203. Compare also the lip service given to the requirement
that the Federal Trade Commission act only' in the "public interest"-implying that the
practices involved must be of some magnitude-which is reduced to a mere averment of
the conclusion of such interest without allegations of fact to support it. Hills Bros. v.
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 25.

NOTES

term "unfair" although inclusive of practices tending to restrain trade by a
monopoly, 32 clearly includes some that impair commerce not at all.33 In some
cases, the Supreme Court has sustained the Commission's condemnation of the
practice of fixing the resale price even though there was no monopoly of the
source of the commodity and so no restraint on commerce.34 But the decision of
the greatest significance to the N. I. R. A. was that recently made in Federal
Trade Commission v. Keppel Bros.,3" where the Supreme Court, in sustaining an
order directing a manufacturer to cease the distribution of candy packages that
encouraged buying through a gambling device, said:
"A method of competition which casts upon one's competitors the
burden of the loss of business unless they will descend to a practice which
they are under a powerful moral compunction not to adopt, even though it
is not criminal, was thought to involve the kind of unfairness at which the
statute was aimed." "
In times of a national crisis, can it not fairly be said that an employer is under
a "powerful moral compunction" not to compete by lowering standards of labor
and so his price to the consumer, and that the federal government can, as in the
Keppel case, prevent such competitive practices? Furthermore, under the
N. I. R. A., the narrow question of whether the Commission was justified in
labeling a practice "unfair" is not material. Once the express code condemnation
of a practice is found to be, as an executive regulation, within the unusually broad
expression of congressional purpose,3 7 the practice, by the terms of the Act,
automatically becomes "unfair" and subject to the Commission's action.38
This discussion, however, cannot fairly end without devoting some consideration to that ancient protest: How far are you going to go? Ignoring the realities of the modern commercial structure and deeply devoted to the traditional
concept of two governments, rigidly separated,3 9 there is a widespread feeling that
the retail store, an attribute of every neighborhood, is thereby peculiarly local and
a sanctuary that the federal touch can but profane. The difficulty with this
attitude is that it stresses the physical location of the store and overlooks its
essential function as an agency necessary to the flow of interstate commerce.
But the real answer to the question will probably be found in the conservative
attitude of those charged with the administration of the recovery program.
I Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (192o) ; Toledo

Threading Mach. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, ii F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 6th,
Pipe
1926).
=Juvenile Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923),
certioraridenied, 263 U. S. 705, 44 Sup. Ct. 34 (1923).
"Beechnut Packing Co. v. United States; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park & Sons
Co., both supra note 14. These cases are strongly criticised in DIcKINsON, loc. cit. supra
note 18. In Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U. S. 463, 43 Sup. Ct.
45o (1922), an agreement by the retailer to use only a certain type of gasoline in pumps
that were provided him was upheld on the ground that there was no restraint of commerce
as long as the retailer could have acquired similar pumps elsewhere.

"'78 Sup. Ct. 497 (1933), (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. RFv. 664.
C'Id. at 50,; cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., supra note 2.
SN. I. R. A. tit. i, § I, Declaration of Policy, whicl after declaring "a national
emergency productive of widespread unemployment and disorganization of industry", expresses the intention to remove burdens upon interstate commerce by a general economic
program.
'Supra note 17. The recent grant of a hearing by the Supreme Court, U. S. L. W.,
March 2o, 1934, at 6og, in the case of United States v. Smith, U. S. L. W., March 13, 1934,
at 594 (D. C. Tex.), will probably result in one of the first determinative decisions on the
N. I. R. A. In this case, the lower court held that the Petroleum Code regulations were
not within the purposes of the Act, and so were unauthorized.
z The doctrine of "dual federalism" is strongly criticised in Corwin, supra note 26, as
having no support from the text of the Constitution or any proper interpretation of it.
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In the first place, there is great reliance upon the voluntary cooperation of
the industry itself. The Code of Fair Competition for the Retail Trade creates
a National Retail Council mainly composed of representatives of the trade who
can thereby intelligently control its practices. 40 State legislation both to suspend
the operation of state anti-trust statutes and to enforce code provisions has been
recommended and adopted.41 Much depends on these aspects of the program. 42
In the second place, in carrying out the enforcing provisions of the Act,
the administration has wisely elected to confine them to retail establishments that
43
are "necessary outlets for productive enterprises of a national character".
Clearly this policy is soundly in accord with the theory justifying all retail regulation, and should include, for example, the retailing of steel, coal, automobiles,
motion pictures and grain and meat products. One case already has adopted that
principle in the regulation of a gasoline filling station.44 The code authorities
admit that the principle does not include such local services as barber shops,
although it would seem that they claim control over pressing and cleaning establishments. 5 In the normal case, it is felt that this distinction is tenuous.4
But the great game of the bench and bar of defining legal concepts-of one
to draw the line and of the other to guess where it will fall-should today be
played with a deep consciousness of the crying needs of the nation that brought
forth the recovery legislation. Little has been said herein about the effect of the
emergency upon the application of constitutional principles. Even admitting it
was not of such magnitude as to justify a reliance upon the nation's inherent
power of self-preservation, yet there is something tragic in a federal government
which, in the face of the helplessness of its component parts, must submit to
'

Art. x of the Code (appr'd Oct.

21, 1933).
Recovery Release No. 7, Jan. 22, 1933; No. 27, July 5, 1933, and statutes,
C. C. H. Inc., Federal Trade Regulation Service (1934) 1965, 189o; 1981, 1900.13; 14,003,
In the recent case of Texas v. Standard Oil Co., U. S. L. W., Dec. 12, 1933, at
If
i4,ooi.

'National

the Petroleum Code was held to take precedence automatically over the state anti-trust
legislation on the theory of the supremacy of federal statutes.
'Supra note 7. The general reliance upon established forms of administrative procedure is discussed in Wahrenbrock, supra note 31, at IO3O.
'National Recovery Release No. 3265, Feb. 13, 1934, U. S. L. W., Feb. 20, 1934, at
518; Release No. io,June 23, 1933, C. C. H. Inc., Federal Trade Regulation Service
(i934) 1968, 11893. For cases holding municipal barber shop regulations unconstitutional
see McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 F. Supp. 855 (D. C. Wash. 1933); Ernesti v. City of
Grand Island. U. S. L. W., Jan. 23, 1934, at 432 (Neb.).
282,

"Victor v. Ickes, U. S. L. W., Dec. 5, 1933, at 23o, upheld the Petroleum Code's con-

demnation of premiums to sell gasoline on the basis that the filling station was an essential
part of the stream of interstate commerce. Cf. Brodsky v. Sharbu Operating Co. Inc., C. C.
H. Inc., Federal Trade Regulation Service (934) 5332, 117110 (N. Y. Co. Feb. 7, 1934),
permitting the operator of a motion picture projector to enjoin a wage cut in violation of
the industry's code.
'In

Purvis v. Bazemore, U. S. L. W., Dec. 5, 1933, at 23o, a Federal District Court of

Florida held that one cleaner could not enjoin another's violation of the code because the
business was local and without effect upon interstate commerce, making the code regulation
of it invalid, and because no federal official was party plaintiff. General Counsel Richberg,
in N. I. R. A. Release No. 2067, Dec. 4, 1933, C. C. H. Inc., Federal Trade Regulation
Service (934) io,ii6, f1loi6o, disagrees with the "dictue"of this case, and seems to rely
upon the undoubted effect upon interstate commerce of general business conditions, citing
United States v. Ferger, supra note 9. Where the normal cleaning business is clearly not
within the stream of interstate commerce, its relative unimportance to national prosperity
suggests that an extension of federal power to anything that might improve general conditions
is unnecessary.
"The two cases upholding regulation of the cleaning industry were based on unusual
facts. In United States v. Spotless Cleaners, Inc., N. Y. L. J., April 4, 3934, at i, the
facts disclosed that the New York defendant sent his materials to New Jersey for the actual
cleaning. The case of Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427,
52 Sup. Ct. 6o7 (1932), was based on the plenary power of Congress over the District of

Columbia.
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social anarchy without the power to afford prompt relief. A remedy has been
proposed. Although necessarily novel in some respects, it is carefully planned
to come within a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution. Irrespective of
its economic merit, it is to be hoped that no unenlightened insistence upon outmoded constitutional doctrine will deny it an opportunity to alleviate conditions
or to make way for a remedy that will.
E.J.R.

GOVERNMENT

BY EXECUTIVE

ORDER-The emphatic manner with which the

present administration has been conducting governmental affairs for over a year
renders both interesting and important the problem of the limits to which executive action will be permitted to extend. An analysis of the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court is essentially the starting point for this purpose. From
them may be gleaned the part played by the executive department in the past, the
manner in which controversies arise as a result of disputed authority, and finally
the policy of the court in reaching its conclusions. Inquiry into the language and
meaning of the Constitution and into the fundamental theory of government on
which it is founded-a system of checks and balances effectuated by a separation
of powers-furnishes further clues which lend aid to the solution of the question.
Of course, some study of the current action and the basis upon which it proceeds
is necessary in order to make a comparison with past action and the basis upon
which it proceeded, and thereby to draw the conclusions toward which this discussion is pointed.'
Unaccompanied by any fanfare, executive measures of the past received
relatively little popular notice. But that their importance was not overlooked is
indicated by the amount of litigation which arose to enlist the aid of the Supreme
Court, for the purpose literally of putting the executive department in its proper
place, and by numerous discussions by legal commentators. 2 The controversy has
embraced not only orders of the President 3 but, in addition, action by his subordinates both when they acted in his stead,4 and when performing duties directly
imposed upon them.' The nature of our government being one of delegated
powers,8 support for all such action must be found in the Constitution directly,
'This discussion will be confined to actual governmental operation by the executive.
No treatment will be made of another equally current and important function of that department and of the President particularly, control over the course of legislation in Congress.
Cf. Woodrow Wilson, Leaderless Government (1898) 6 Am. LAwYER 165; Haines, Ministerial Responsibility Versus the Separation of Powers (1922) 16 Am. PoL. Sci. REV. 194.
- Win. Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judicial Branches of the Government (1916) 25 YAiE L. J. 599; Green, Separation of
Governmental Powers (192o) 29 id. at 369; Fairlie, Administrative Legislation (1920) is
Micu. L. REv. 181; Coffey, Executive Encroachment Upon the Judiciary (ig3i) 9 TENN.
L. REv. 146.
'The Brig Aurora v. United States, II U. S. 382 (1813); Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348 (1928) ; United States v. Campbell, 5 F. Supp. 156
(S. D. N. Y. 1933), (934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 395.
'Wilcox v. Jackson d. McConnel, 38 U. S. 498 (1839); The Confiscation Cases,
87 U. S. 92 (1873) ; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. I, io Sup. Ct. 658 (i89o) ; Jones v. United
States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. so (i89o) ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272
U. S. I, 47 Sup. Ct. 1 (1926).
'Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 2o4 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367 (1907); Smith v.
Hitchcock, 226 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 6 (1912) ; Houston v. St. Louis Ind. Packing Co., 249
U. S. 479, 39 Sup. Ct. 332 (8919) ; Tagg Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, 280 U. S.
420, 50 Sup. Ct. 220 (1930) ; United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S.
77, 53 Sup. Ct. 42 (1932).
'U. S. CONST., Amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people."
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or in some statute which in turn has a constitutional foundation. Consequently,
most orders emanating from the executive department recite, as part of their very
terms, the authority which is considered their basis. 7 Even where express authority for particular procedure is lacking, it is usually included in some more general
delegation, and the Court has been quick to recognize both the existence and
necessity for such implied or incidental powers." And though the opinion of the
department exercising the power is taken into consideration,9 ultimately it is the
Supreme Court which determines the propriety of the action.
As a result of the self-imposed limitation that it may deal only with "cases
10
and will not indulge in any advisory opinions, no question
and controversies",
decree comes before the Court until someone is adversely
executive
of any
affected by it, or is in immediate danger of being injured as a result of its operation. The most common manners therefore in which a doubt upon the validity
of the order is presented to the Court are: (i) by an appeal to the equitable
jurisdiction of the Court to enjoin enforcement of an order which has been
made;'-1 (2) as matter of defense where the government invokes the aid of the
courts in enforcing an order;i2 (3) by an independent action by the affected
13
person to recover a penalty or other payment made under protest, or to recover
4
damages resulting from operation of the order." Grounds advanced for declaring the executive decree invalid are usually of the same nature, no matter which
of the above forms of action is pursued, and are in fact usually framed in similar
15
language, of a type most likely to appeal to the Court's sense of duty as defender
Of necessity, however, there is a difference between the
of the Constitution.'"
general reason suggested, depending upon whether the order in question is based
See, for example: ExEc. ORDER, Mar. 27, x934, U. S. L. W., April IO, I934, at 686;
Mar. 7, 1934, U. S. L. W., Mar. 13, 1934, at 589; Proclamation of President,
Jan. 31, 1934, U. S. L. W., Feb. 6, 1934, at 459.
' "There is not in the whole of that admirable instrument [the Constitution], a grant
of powers which does not draw after it others, not expressed, but vital to their exercise;
not substantive and independent, indeed, but auxiliary and subordinate." Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U. S. 2o4, 225 (1821). See also United States v. Birdsall, 233 U. S. 223, 230, 34 Sup. Ct.
512, 514 (94) ; Maul v. United States, 274 U. S. 501, 524, 47 Sup. Ct. 735, 743 (1927).
'See infra note 27.
"oThe limitation is said to be self-imposed because it is as a result of the Court's own
interpretation that Art. III, Sec. 2, cl. i is held to include matters in controversy. See
La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, I75 U. S. 423, 456, 20 Sup. Ct. 168, 179 (899);
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. I26, 129, 42 Sup. Ct. 274, 275 (1922).
' Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U. S. 475 (1866); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 27 Sup.
Ct. 233 (9o7) ; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285 (1932) ; Carr v. Gordon,
82 Fed. 373 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1897); Campbell v. Medalie, 5 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N. Y.
1933) ; Spiegel v. Ford, 5 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1933).
"Rider v. United States, 178 U. S. 251, 20 Sup. Ct. 838 (igoo) ; Norwegian Nitrogen
Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 53 Sup. Ct. 350 (1933) ; Hampton & Co. v. United
States, supra note 3; United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., supra note 5.
'Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495 (1892); Fawcus Machine Co. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 375, 51 Sup. Ct. 144 (931) ; Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287
U. S. 324, 53 Sup. Ct. 164 (932).
"4Swaim v. United States, 165 U. S. 553, 17 Sup. Ct. 448 (897) ; United States v.
United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, 25 Sup. Ct. 222 (19o5) ; Myers v. United States,
272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 23 (1926).
A comparison of the arguments of counsel in the cases cited supra notes II to 14 will
indicate the similarity mentioned.
" Considering the Supreme Court as "defender of the Constitution" may seem a bit
strange especially since the President's oath requires him to "preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States". U. S. CoNsT., Art. II, Sec. I, cl. 7. But it is the
Court that determines whether even he is executing his duties within the limits prescribed
so that the appellation fits the Court even more properly than the President.
EXEC ORDER,
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directly on the Constitution or on a statutory enactment. In the latter case the
weight of the argument is borne by an assault upon the constitutionality of the
statute professing to authorize executive action.' 7 Various constitutional defects
are offered, the most common being that there is a delegation of either legislative
or judicial power, or in some instances both.' s Another favorite defect is that
the action deprives the complainant of the privilege of being heard by a properly
constituted judicial tribunal. 19 An argument much less employed, is that the
particular action is not authorized by the statute. Counsel presses the statutory
failing oftener because of the more sweeping effect of such an argument if sustained, although as will be pointed out more fully later the Court relies almost
exclusively upon an inquiry whether the order is adequately included within the
statute.
On the other hand, where sanction for an executive order is alleged to come
directly from the Constitution, the controversy will usually center around some
statute which has sought to limit the provision invoked as authority.20 In such
case the government assumes the task of proving either that the statute does not
cover the order or, if it does, that it is unconstitutional. 2' Very little litigation
arises in this manner, since most executive action is taken on the basis of enabling
statutes (rather than in contradiction to limiting ones) which are passed to define
and give substance to the general phraseology of the Constitution. The most
practical explanation for this is that appropriations are necessary for the conduct
of any activity,
22 and Congress must initiate action to allow any disbursement from
the treasury.
Where the validity of executive action is involved, the federal courts exhibit
a tendency to be hypercritical of their own jurisdiction with the evident purpose
of avoiding actual decision whenever possible.23 A similar purpose to restrict
decision can be seen in cases requiring some fact-finding by the executive before
deciding upon what order to make, for the Court will endeavor to review only
the law involved and not the facts, 2' although on occasion a revision of facts
' Cf. Roughton v. Knight, 2i9 U. S. 537, 31 Sup. Ct. 297 (I9II) ; Mississippi v. Johnson,
supra note II; and cases infra notes I8 and 1g.
' Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (19o4) ; Wisconsin v. Illinois
& Sanitary District of Chicago, :278 U. S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163 (1929); United States v.
Chemical Foundation, supra note 4; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, supra note 5; Field
v. Clark, supra note 13.
" United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (igo5) ; Passavant v. United
States, 148 U. S. 214, 13 Sup. Ct. 572 (1893) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 51
Sup. Ct. 6o8 (1931); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U. S. 329, 53 Sup. Ct. 167
(1932) ; Smith v. Hitchcock, sopra note 5.
'United States v. Eliason, 41 U. S. 291 (1842) ; Parsons v. United States, i67 U. S.
324, 17 Sup. Ct. 880 (i897) ; Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 23 Sup. Ct. 535
(19o3)
; Swaim v. United States, supra note 14.
t
Ibid.
U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7.
' Smith v. Whitney, II6 U. S. 167, 6 Sup. Ct. 570 (i886) (no jurisdiction to restrain
Secretary of Navy from holding court martial, by writ of prohibition); Cruickshank v.
Bidwell, 176 U. S. 73, 20 Sup. Ct. 280 (1900) (no equity jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement
of "unconstitutional law" where adequate remedy at law) ; Mississippi v. Johnson, supra
note ii (no equity jurisdiction to enjoin President from enforcing allegedly unconstitutional
Reconstruction Act because it was executive duty requiring discretion) ; Passavant v. United
States, supra note 19 (no jurisdiction to hear appeals from board of general appraisers on
"dutiable value" of imports) ; Transcontinental & Western Airlines, Inc. v. Kiely & Farley,
S. D. N. Y., Feb. 16, 1934 (no jurisdiction to enjoin cancellation of mail contracts since carrying mails is governmental function and suit to compel certain action is essentially suit against
United States which cannot be brought without consent).
'Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U. S. 162, 53 Sup. Ct. 380 (I933) ; United States v.
Ju Toy, supra note 1g; Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F. (2d) 247 (Customs App.
193o), certioraridenied, 28z U. S. 852, 5I Sup. Ct. 29 (1930).
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becomes necessary.2 5 This apparent desire to sustain executive decrees is to be
expected, as analogous to the admitted policy of upholding Congressional action
in any way possible. 26 While there has been something akin to rivalry with
Congress since the Court assumed the power to declare laws unconstitutional, the
relationship with the executive has been rather friendly, so that the latter could
certainly be expected to bold as favored a position in the feelings of our Supreme
Court as does the legislative department. The statement might even be ventured
that the Court is more favorable to upholding the executive, in view of the
numerous dicta to the effect that administrative procedure and interpretation of
statutes are to be considered2 7 very fully before any decision is rendered holding
action under them improper.

The natural inference from the Court's reluctance to deal at all with controversies over executive action is, that it is anxious to allow the exercise of such
powers without interference. This conclusion is fortified when the cases where
the Court has come to a decision show stronger evidence of the same purpose,
not only from the number upholding executive orders, but, what is of more
importance, from the reasoning by which much of the litigation has been concluded. In a wide range of cases involving a variety of orders, the actual motivating force causing the Court to arrive at a particular result, is the necessity
for the continued use of such an order to ensure the most effective operation of
the government.28 However, this is not offered alone by the Court as its reason,
but is usually accompanied by a flood of constitutional language to bring the case
within the words used in some former decision. These words are always very
broad statements usually to the effect that this order does not violate the separation of powers required by the Constitution, nor the terms and meaning of the
statute conferring the power to act.29 The Court will often add that the statute
does not improperly attempt to delegate legislative or judicial authority. But
should it feel that the contested act is an improper one, its reason is almost
invariably that the statute on which it was based did not include the particular
type of procedure by the executive, although it sometimes seems that the Court
could with equal justification have decided that the statute did include such action
and was therefore unconstitutional.' 0
The customary phrases in the cases tend to obscure the variations in facts
involved and the distinctions among the executive acts presented for determination. A few examples will show how really diverse are the purposes to which
executive action may be applied. The leading case of Hampton & Co. v. United
' "Save as there may be an exception for issues presenting claims of constitutional
right, such administrative findings on issues of fact are accepted by the court as conclusive
if the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain them and there was no irregularity in proceedings." Phillips v. Commissioner, supra note 19, at 6oo, 51 Sup. Ct. at 613. Cf. Tagg
Bros. & Moorehead v. United States, supra note 5, at 443, 50 Sup. Ct. at 226; United States
v. Ju Toy, supra note 19, at 262, 25 Sup. Ct. at 646.
' "This Court, by an unbroken line of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the
present day, has steadily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of
the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational doubt." Adkins v.
Childrens Hospital, *61 U. S. 525, 544, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 396 (1923).
-'See Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 336, 5o Sup. Ct. 115, 117 (193o); Fawcus
Machine Co. v. United States, supra note 13, at 378, 51 Sup. Ct. at 145.
'Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904); United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 5o6, 31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1911); Hampton & Co. v. United
States, supra note 3; Wisconsin v. Illinois & Sanitary District of Chicago, supra note 18.
'Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 53 Sup. Ct. 751 (1933) ; United States v.
Chemical Foundation, supra note 4; United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
supra note 5.
0 Cf. Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 38 Sup. Ct. 395 (x918) ; United States v. United
Verde Copper Co., supra note 14.
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States3 decided that the President could properly be empowered to revise tariff
rates within certain limits set by statute after consulting the Tariff Commission.
Another important case, Union Bridge Co. v. United States,32 upheld action by
the Secretary of War with regard to freeing navigation from unreasonable
obstructions by making regulations for bridges over navigable rivers. The Court
fully realized in both cases the necessity that the executive department perform
these dutits, but failed to note any distinction betweeen the necessities involved
in each, and in both cites many of the same cases, including two old ones from
Pennsylvania,3" which very formally deal with what constitutes an improper
delegation of authority. In the tariff situation, it is to further the interests of
commerce that executive action is required so that changes may be made much
more rapidly and thereby keep a proper check upon foreign trade. On the other
hand, the regulation of bridges over navigable streams is better handled by the
executive department because it would be very inconvenient for Congress to
make proper rules for all sections of a country with so many geographic variations. A third instance showing the variety of executive acts is in the Postoffice
Department, where rulings are constantly being made by subordinate officials with
regard to the classes and acceptability of mail under the statutes. Here also it is
necessity that justifies the action. But the necessity concerns itself more with
relieving the courts of the impossible burden of making the countless decisions
required in handling the mails. 84 Illustrations could be multiplied, each differing
slightly in facts and requirements, but most of them supported by the same
authority in the Court.33
Thus, when confronted with a case in which it is argued that there is an
improper delegation of legislative or judicial powers, the Court, if it desires to
uphold the action, will show how essential it is, and then go through the necessary
formula of saying that it does not infringe upon the powers of either the legislative or judicial departments, or cite some cases which have said so. In no case
found does the Court, admitting that the action is necessary, find an improper
delegation. The conclusion therefore seems inevitable that when the Court finds
necessity present, language will be supplied to support the decision. This leads
to an inquiry as to the reason for such indirection. Do the cases demand it?
Does the Constitution demand it? The first might be answered in the affirmative
since, as has been indicated, all cases follow the same routine. Then it would
seem that the second must be answered likewise because all our law is ultimately
founded on the Constitution, to which each case adds a step in interpretation.
But it is here contended that the proper interpretation is not the one usually conveyed by the words of the opinions, but it is really the reasons present in the
minds of the Justices when they render their decisions. No imputation is made
as to the value of these real forces, nor that language is used to cover them
because the Constitution does not permit decisions on their authority. The complaint is induced by the fact that the same decisions not only should be made
'

Supra note 3.
SSupra note 5.
Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Pa. 188 (1853) ; Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491 (1872).

Smith v. Hitchcock, supra note 5; Public Clearing House v. Coyne, supra note 28.
'I re Kollock, x65 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444 (1897) (Secretary of Treasury regulated stampings on oleomargarine for revenue purposes) ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, supra note
i8 (Secretary of Treasury provided rules for excluding unvholesome foreign teas) ; Caha
v. United States, 152 U. S. 211, 14 Sup. Ct. 513 (1894) (Secretary of Interior made rules
for adjudicating land contests); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S.
320, 29 Sup. Ct. 671 (i9o9) (Secretary of Commerce ordered payment of penalty for bringing in undesirable aliens when he thought an improper investigation had been made by
Steamship Co.).
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without circumlocution, but could be made so both under the language of the
Constitution and the theory of separation of powers.3 6
Credit for the perfection of a governmental set-up consisting of three
departments-the legislative, executive and judiciary-with a system of checks
and balances among them, is popularly given to the French philosopher Montesquieu whose work De L'Esprit des Lois appeared in 1748. Some prefer to
attribute the theory to Harrington's Oceana, Locke's Civil Government and
others,3 7 but accepting any or all of these, their influence on the framers of the
Constitution is well established 28 Indeed the resemblance of the provisions of
that document 3 9 especially to Montesquieu's ideal government as he visualized
England is indeed marked. 40 But neither the theory nor the practical application
in our Constitution stopped at segregation into three departments. They went
further and placed limitations upon each division in the hands of one of the
others. Thus the executive has a veto upon legislation,41 and the legislature's
consent is required to many executive functions such as appointments and
treaties. 42 It follows that though there are separate departments, each has some
duties which link it to another and which interrelate the functions of all. Nothing
can be singled out in the Constitution which completely defines the functions of
each department. On the contrary, its language is in the most general terms;
it talks of "executive power", "legislative powers" and "judicial power".4 3 These
"powers" are quite different from functions, and a more apt interpretation of
their meaning would be that executive power, for example, embraces mostly
executive functions such as administration of the laws; but further, that it also
includes some legislative functions and judicial functions. There have been dicta
indicative of recognition of such an interpretation, as the following by Mr. Justice
Brandeis:
"The separation of the powers of government did not make each branch
completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, dependent upon the
others, as it left to each power to exercise, in some respects, functions in their
nature executive, legislative and judicial." 14
"The theory of separation of powers has received exhaustive treatment both in the
cases and legal literature of this country. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U. S.
524, 61o (1838) ; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, i9o (i88o) ; Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 201, 48 Sup. Ct. 480, 482 (1928) ; O'Donoghue v. United States, 289
U. S. 516, 530, 53 Sup. Ct. 740, 743 (1933); Fisher, Are the Departments of Government
Independent of Each Other? (1887) 2I AM. L. REv. 21o; Meigs, The Independence of the
Departments of Government (1889) 23 id. at 594; Powell, Separation of Powers (0913)
28 POL ScI. Q. 34; Haines, supra note i; Taft; Green, both supra note 2.
"But that same justice which accords the glory of aviation to the Wright brothers
over the tentative claims of air-minded inventors from Icarus and Darius Green to Langley,
must give Montesquieu this glory. He alone made the doctrine articulate, philosophical,
attractive." Brand, Montesquiea and the Separation of Powers (3933) 12 ORE. L. Rv.
175, 180.

'Brand, supra note 37.
'In a recent article by Professor Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution (3934)
34 Co. L. Rxv. 1, 3, the thought is expressed that our working constitution is ". . . in
essence not a document, but a living institution built (historically, genetically) in first
instance around a particular Document, . . ."
I MoQTESQUEu, Da L'Esrar nEs Lois (1748) bk. xi, c. vi.
'U.
S. CoNsT., Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2.
1Id., Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2.
"Id., Art I, Sec. i, cl. i. "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." Art. II, Sec. i, cl. i. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America." Art. III, Sec. i. "The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."
Myers v. United States, su ra note 14, at 291, 47 Sup. Ct. at 84.
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Another by Mr. justice Holmes:
"It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction
between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into watertight, compartments, were it ever so desirable
to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution
requires." 45

Unfortunately no cases have been decided on these precepts and they have been
confined largely to dissenting opinions.
Proceeding to other Constitutional requirements; it may be pointed out that
no express prohibition is made of delegating legislative or judicial authority to
the executive. Only by inference can this interpretation be made from the provisions establishing the three departments, where the powers are discussed. 40 In
this connection it is interesting to note that those powers are not stated to be
exclusive while in providing for government of the District of Columbia, at the
time unacquired, the express words "exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever" are used.47 A logical conclusion would be that it was not intended to
make the other "powers" exclusive. While the Supreme Court's interpretation
on this point would be conclusive, no executive action, to repeat, has been noted
which was disapproved because the statute authorizing it has been an improper
delegation; where overruled it was on the ground that it exceeded the terms of
the statute. Any expression as to delegation per se being unconstitutional is
therefore confined to the dictum class. The Court is thus not precluded, on pain
of reversing itself, from holding that a measure of admittedly judicial and legislative functions is permissible to the executive. As a matter of fact all three
functions are exercised by the executive, and with the approval of the Court.48
The Court, however, preserves the separation of powers by calling them administrative acts, 45 because they are necessary to the proper conduct of the government.
Admitting all the foregoing observations to be correct, why raise the problem,
when it is conceded that the Supreme Court actually reaches the best results,
applies the proper tests though preferring to dress its conclusion in the conventional language, and does not thereby overstep the bounds of the Constitution?
The answer to this question is a present need for the realistic treatment suggested.
The Supreme Court will shortly be confronted with cases in which executive
action under the "new deal" legislation will be hotly contested. 50 It is possible
Springer v. Philippine Islands, szpra note 36, at 211, 48 Sup. Ct. at 485.
"Supra note 43.
7 U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17.
See cases supra notes iI, 12, 13, 18, 19.
"See United States v. Grimaud, supranote 28, at 521, 31 Sup. Ct. at 484; and other cases,
supra note 28.
COU. S. L. W., Mar. 13, 934, at 585. Many other cases have come before state and
lower federal courts which also will probably be appealed to the Supreme Court, e. g., United
States v. Smith, E. D. Tex., Feb. 26, 1934; Cleaners & Dyers Board of Trade v. Spotless
Dollar Cleaners, Inc., N. Y. County Sup. Ct., Feb. 19, 1934; United States v. Spotless Dollar
Cleaners, Inc., S. D. N. Y., March 31, 1934; Hillsborough Packingi Co. v. Wallace, S. D.
Fla., Feb. r, 1934. A contest of the gold requisitioning order was begun in United States
v. Campbell, supra note 3, and after a ruling partly adverse to the government was appealed
to the Supreme Court. But later the matter was dismissed on motion of the government, 54
Sup. Ct. 455 (1934). New attacks are being made on the gold orders in three recent actions:
(i) A suit in a New Jersey federal court to compel payment in gold of corporate gold notes;
(2)
a suit in the Court of Claims based on the refusal of the government to pay the new gold
equivalent in currency for coins turned in; (3) diplomatic negotiation by the Republic of
Panama under treaty provisions, demanding gold in payment of rent for Canal Zone. U. S.
L. W., Mar. 13, 1934, at 586.
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that if the Court insists on a retention of the formal language, it will have difficulty in upholding some of the orders where such a result may be desirable, and
even proper under the real tests which are concealed in the decisions. Should the
Court deem the executive action improper, it will probably be unable to avoid a
decision on the statutes themselves, since they are worded in the most general
language so as to include almost limitless action by the executive. 51 Aside from
any discussion of the propriety of these matters politically or economically, it is
highly desirable that the legal phase be adjudicated as directly as the situation
permits. Much of the future governmental operation of this country will depend
upon the decisions made in these cases, and it is essential that reasons alone, rather
than in conjunction with conventional words, be used to accomplish the results.
Should the Court determine to modify its former approach when it deals
with the coming litigation, it will not be left entirely without authority, for a
distinct policy is discernible from the decisions and may be briefly summarized
as follows:
(i) Necessity will, as previously suggested, be a very weighty factor in the
final determination of the Court.52 It may safely be called the most influential
one as it properly should be, since thereby the best interests of governmental
operation are certain to be considered.
(2) The Court generally requires that the statute designate the policy which
Congress seeks to establish so that the action of the executive may be judged in
the light of that policy. This also furnishes a reason to the Court for upholding
any apparent executive legislation by saying that it is merely supplying the detail
for carrying out the policy enunciated.55
(3) In addition to the policy-by-Congress requirement, there is the important corollary that the executive order conform to it. Thus even though the order
may seem proper in scope and language, it will not be upheld if it produces
another than the desired end.5
(4) The degree of definiteness with which the statutes provides for executive
action is of importance. For example, if rules are specified by which the administration of the provisions should be conducted, with power to make any necessary
additional rules, none of the latter will be permitted to infringe upon the original
ones. 55 However, if the power to make all rules and regulations is granted, but
none originally set, the Court will allow more extensive action. 6 Present statutes
tend more toward the latter form both because of the greater flexibility in enforcement, and the enormous amount of business now confronting Congress as compared with the lesser business of the past when more detailed enaction was
possible.5
(5) Provision for the enforcement of an order by means of a criminal
prosecution or imposition of a penalty will in no way limit the type of executive
regulation except that it must appear clearly from the statute that a penalty was
contemplated.-5 The origin of a penalty in the executive rules is less likely to
be tolerated.59
See infra notes 61-64.
Though an attempt to define what the Court considers "necessity" has been purposely
avoided, some indication has been made supra at p. 742 and note 28,
' United States v. Chemical Foundation, supra note 4; United States v. Shreveport
Grain & Elevator Co., supra note 5 ; Field v. Clark, mipra note 13.
IMorrill v. Jones, io6 U. S. 466, I Sup. Ct. 423 (1882); United States v. United
Verde Copper Co., supra note 14; Waite v. Macy, supra note 30.
'United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14, 33 Sup. Ct. 412 (1913).
r United States v. Bailey, 34 U. S. 238 (1835) ; United States v. Wilbur, 283 U. S. 414,
51 Sup.
Ct. 502 (193i) ; Houston v. St. Louis Ind. Packing Co., supra note 5.
57 FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930) II.
' Hamburg-American Line v. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 491 (1934) ; Cahi v. United
States, supra note 35.
' United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, 12 Sup. Ct. 764 (1892).
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(6) The Court will usually keep aloof from orders made with respect to
subordinates in the civil or military service, and considers them as intradepartmental matters concerning the supervision of inferior by superior officials.60
Even a cursory examination of representative legislation of the past year
National Industrial Recovery
such0 2 as, the Agricultural Adjustment Act,"- the
0
Act,

the National Banking Emergency Act, ' and the Gold Reserve Act of

193404 shows the important and absolutely legislative duties which are granted to
the executive department. The orders which have been issued under these statutes
are certainly legislative in character. 65 And yet, the elements of these acts are
embraced within the principles above, abstracted from decided cases. Necessity,
policy, delegation, and penalty are all part and parcel of the "new deal" enactments. The decisions of the Court will in a large measure define how these and
other elements of its policy will be applied, a feature which it is difficult to observe
from former cases. Whichever way the judgment goes, it is to be hoped the
Court will at least reach a straightforward solution, supported by reasons in
themselves sufficient, without a buttress of formal language which would immediately cast a doubt upon the Court's own belief in the strength of the reasons
alone.
Lest the contrary be implied, it is emphasized that no new and revolutionary
tests are suggested for the use of the Court. The cases themselves have formulated a distinct policy which the foregoing discussion has endeavored to outline.
But the policy can be applied to best advantage only if unhampered by language
requiring an absolute separation of powers, which, it is suggested, is neither a
part of the theory nor of the Constitution. The policy is adequate and admits of
change as the Court from time to time deems proper, but the most strained
interpretation may fall short of bringing a given controversial order within the
magic phrases.
L. J.G.

TAXING THE INCOME OF A TRUST WHEN THE BENEFICIARY OF THE INCOME

HAS No INTEREST IN THE CORPUS OF THE ESTATE-The United States Supreme

Court has held in Irwin v. Gavit,1 that where a decedent's estate is left in trust
subject to the provision that the income of the estate shall go to a named beneficiary for a limited number of years, the income so received by the beneficiary is
taxable to him, although he has no interest, present or remainder, in the corpus
of the estate. This holding is clear and has been applied easily to situations substantially the same as that in Irwin v. Gavit; 2 but attempts to apply it to different
factual situations have resulted in great confusion and misunderstanding. The
result is a conflict among the cases, and an attack upon the holding of Irwin v.
Gavit itself.
I Swaim v. United States, supra note 14; United States v. Eliason; Shurtleff v. United
States, both supra note 2o; Taylor v. Kercheval, 82 Fed. 497 (C. C. D. Ind. 1897).
7 U. S. C. A. § 61o (Supp. 1933).
6148 STAT. 31 § I0 (933),
6248 STAT. 195 § 1o (933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 710 (Supp. 1933).
6148 STAT. I §§2, 3 (1933), 50U. S. C. A. App. §5 (Supp. 1933), 12 U. S: C. A. §248
(Supp. 1933).
o'P. L. No. 87, 73d Congress, Jan. 30, 1934, §§ 3, 6, II.
See ExEc. ORDER, Feb. 23, 1934, U. S. L. W., Mar. 6, 1934, at 547; Order of N. R. A.
Administrator, Mar. I, 1934, id. at 548; Treasury Regulations, Jan. 30, 31, 1934, U. S. L. W.,
Feb. 6, 1934, at 461; and orders cited supra note 7.
'268 U. S. I6I, 45 Sup. Ct. 475 (1925).
2
Roxburghe v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d) 693 (App. D. C. 1932) ; Appeal of Coxe, 5 B. T. A.
261 (1926).
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The best approach to the problem seems to be through an examination of
some of the arguments advanced against Irvin v. Gavit. A dissenting opinion in
that case a upheld the beneficiary's contention that the income was a bequest, and
so should have been exempt from taxation, under the income tax statute. 4 The
superficiality of this contention becomes manifest, however, when proper emphasis is laid upon the fact that the decedent could not possibly have bequeathed
the income in question: he had no income to bequeath at the time of his death,
for the reason that it did not then exist. He did have a right to receivd the income if, as, and when it should come into existence; this right he bequeathed to
the beneficiary. The fact that there has been a bequest of a right to receive income should not render the income a bequest; and it is the income, not the right,
which is taxable under Irwin v. Gazit.
Less obviously fallacious is the argument that to tax the beneficiary is unconstitutional in that he is then taxed for income which belongs to the trustee,
the latter being the legal owner of the capital which produced the income in question.' It is urged that to the beneficiary this income is a gift, and gifts are exempt from taxation." If it be true that in order to own given income one must
own the capital which produces it, then it would follow that the beneficiary in
Irwin v. Gavit was taxed for income of the trustee. But whether ownership of
income depends upon ownership of capital is the very question at issue. When
the right to receive and enjoy income has been vested irrevocably in a beneficiary,
so that the owner of the capital has no choice but to turn it over to him, it is
highly unrealistic to contend that the owner of the capital is the owner of the
income.' Viewed in this light it may be said that the real holding of Irwin v.
Gavit was that the recipient of the income from a trust fund is sufficiently the
owner of the income when it is earned to be taxable for it.
A far more subtle and substantial contention has been offered in criticism of
Irmin v,. Gavit. This objection is based upon the rule that the purchaser of an
annuity from an insurance company is not taxable for the annual payments he
receives until their total exceeds the sum paid to the insurance company.8 The
theory behind this rule is that each annual payment consists partly of capital paid
2268 U. S. 161, at 168, 45 Sup. Ct. 475, at 476 (1925).
44 STAT. 24 (I926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 954 (1927).
Note (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 413, 418, 419.
'Supra note 4.
'However, in cases involving an assignment of the right to receive income by an owner
of capital, the Board of Tax Appeals has held that the assignor is taxable for the income
received by the assignee. Most of these cases are distinguishable from Irwin v. Gavit, and
the federal court is tending to repudiate those which are not. The distinguishable cases are
of two classes: first, those in which the assignor has received the benefit of the income by
receiving value for the assignment: Rensselaer v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ;
Appeal of American Tel. & Cable Co., 2 B. T. A. 991 (1925) (in both of which the payment
of the income to the assignee discharged a debt owed by the assignor to the assignee) ; Appeal of Browne, 3 B. T. A. 826 (1926); Van Brunt v. Comm'r, ii B. T. A. 4o6 (1928) (in
both of which the assignment was to a wife of the assignor who, by using the income to pay
household expenses, discharged a legal obligation of the assignor) ; second, there are cases
of assignment in which the assignor retains a power to revoke: Mitchell v. Bowers, 9 F. (2d)
414 (S. D. N. Y. 1925) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 34 F. (2d) 656 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). Mitchell
v. Bowers was cited in O'Malley-Keyes v. Eaton, 24 F. (2d) 436, 437 (D. Con. 1928), for
the broad proposition that an assignor of income who retains ownership of the capital is
taxable for the income, but the court limited it to its true holding--i. e., to cases in which the
assignment is revocable by the assignor. The court stated, at 437, "After all, the stark fact
is that the plaintiff did not receive this income, and cannot receive this income. To say that
she did receive it is to indulge in a deliberate fiction." A similar spirit of realism appears
in the decision of Young v. Gnichtel, 28 F. (2d) 789 (D. N. J. 1928).
8
44STAT.24 (I926),26 U. S. C. A. § 954 (1927).
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in by the annuitant and partly of income earned by that capital.9 Since that portion of the payment which is capital is not taxable as income, it is held that the
purchaser is not subject to tax until all his capital has been returned to him. 10
This being so, it is contended that the beneficiary in Irwin v. Gavit has received a
bequest of capital equal to the present value of the expected income-i. e., equal
to such a sum as would suffice to purchase an annuity equivalent to the expected
income payable to him; that each payment consists partly of capital and partly
of income; and that, for this reason, he should pay no tax until the payments he
receives exceed the value of his capital.:" Presented thus, the argument is open
to fatal criticism: the fact is, as pointed out above, that the beneficiary was bequeathed no capital but only a right to receive income; the payments which he is
to receive will consist entirely of income, and not partly of capital and partly of
income, as in the case of a purchased annuity.
The substance of the argument may be presented more convincingly by
considering hypothetical cases. Suppose the beneficiary should sell his right to
the trustee and remainderman, and purchase with the proceeds an annuity from
an insurance company. He would receive annually from the company as much
as he would have received from the estate, and for just as many years, yet would
be taxable for only so much of his receipts as would exceed the sum he had
given in payment. Or suppose he should sell his right to a stranger, and again
purchase an annuity; again he would pay less taxes than if he had retained his
interest under the trust.'2 If he can so easily convert his right into capital, convert the capital into an annuity, and thus reduce his tax burden, does it not
suggest that he should be allowed to deduct even when he does not sell out?
One's substantive rights should not be so easily altered by mere exchanges of
property.
Perhaps the most persuasive form in which this contention can be presented
is the situation in Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner." Certain
property was donated to a charity, the donor reserving to himself the income
for life. The donor contended that in filing his income tax report he should be
allowed to deduct the face value of the property donated because it was a dona' This rule as to insurance annuities is so well established that courts discuss its theory
only when the rule is sought to be applied in new cases. This is illustrated by the cases cited
infra note ii.
" Since each payment consists partly of income, it would seem to be more accurate to tax
the recipient each year for so much of the payment as is income. In fact, it is' difficult to
compute how much of the money paid to the recipient consists of income, and how much of
capital. Moreover, the real question involved is, not which method of computation is the
more sound theoretically, but who should bear the risk of the insurance company's failure to
make the final payments. If the annuitant should pay no tax until his receipts amount to his
invested capital, then the Government would take the risk, for if the insurance company
should become insolvent, the Government would receive no tax at all. If, on the other hand,
the annuitant should pay tax year by year, then the risk would be on him. Should the insurance company become insolvent, he would have paid income tax without having received
as much as he had paid. The controversy, however, is not germane to the present topic; it
is necessary only to point out that under either method of calculation it is admitted that the
annuitant is not taxable for all that he receives.
' This contention has received notice in various cases. A dictum in its favor was enunciated in Dobbins v. Commissioner, 31 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), and it formed the
basis of a concurring opinion in Appeal of McConnell, 3 B. T. A. 260 (1926) and a dissenting opinion in Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B. T. A. 89o (1928).
However, in deciding Codman v. Commissioner, 5o F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. ist, ig3i), the
court rejected this line of reasoning.
'This hypothetical case was used by the dissenting and concurring opinions, supra note
ii, to present their contention more persuasively.
' Supra note II.
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tion to charity.14 The court refused to allow the deduction as requested. It
held that, inasmuch as the existence of the donor's life interest would prevent
the donee from receiving the face value of the property donated, should the latter
attempt to sell it, the value of the donation (and therefore of the requested deduction) should be correspondingly reduced. The donor then contended that, since
the donee's interest in the property donated amounts to but part of its total
capital value, solely because of the existence of the donor's life interest, the remainder of its capital value must necessarily be found in the life interest, thus
making the donor an owner of capital equal to the present value of his life
interest. Since each annual income payment received by him consists in part
of this capital (for admittedly the life interest is reduced as each annual payment
is received by the donor), he should be allowed a corresponding deduction in
filing his income tax return. But this deduction, too, the court refused to allow.
By refusing to allow either deduction requested by the donor, the court
appears to have placed itself in a highly inconsistent position: for one purpose,
the donor's life interest is capital; for another purpose, it is not capital. Of
course, the court might reply that what the donor receives each year consists
wholly of income of the property donated and that someone must be taxed for all
of it. This, however, hardly solves the logical difficulty in the court's position.
The donor might reply that if someone must be taxed, why should not the donee
be taxed, especially in view of the fact that his remainder interest, which is admitted by the court to be worth less than the face value of the donation, gradually
increases in value each year until, when the donor dies, it comes to be worth the
face value of the donation? Is not this increase in value income to the donee? 15
Legalistically, it is possible to reply that the donor has reserved to himself no part
of the capital, but only a right to receive income. But though such a legalistic
reply might adequately refute the equally legalistic contention that the beneficiary
in Irwin.v. Gavit received a bequest, which should be exempt from income tax,
when presented in response to the donor's contention in this case it impresses one
as a mere quibble. After all, the donor can sell his right to receive income, purchase with the proceeds an annuity equivalent in value to the right to income,
and be allowed to deduct part of his annual receipts as capital; after all, the court
has held that the donor owns a capital interest in the property donated for the
purpose of reducing the value of the donation. Most of this applies with equal
force to Irwin v. Gavit. There, as here, the remainderman's interest in the
corpus is worth less than the face value of the corpus so long as the income beneficiary's interest is outstanding; there, too, the remainderman's interest increases
in value as the income beneficiary's interest wears away; and there, too, the
income beneficiary pays tax on all the income, while the remainderman pays none
on the gain in the value of his interest.
'Contributions to charitable institutions are, by statute, deductible from gross income.
27 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 955 (1O) (927).
' In no case has such a tax been levied. Yet it is well established that the excess of the
sale price of property, real or personal, over the cost to the vendor is taxable to him as income: Goodrich v. Edwards, 255 U. S. 527, 41 Sup. Ct. 390 (1921) ; see Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. i89, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193 (192o). Where property is sold by a donee,
the gain is computed by ascertaining the excess of the sale price over the cost to the donor,
or last preceding owner who was a purchaser for value: 43 STAT. 258 (1924), 26 U. S. C.
A. § 935 (1927). There would seem to be no valid reason for drawing a distinction between
the sale of tangible goods, and the sale of intangible property. The right which the remainderman receives is property; it may be converted on the market for tangible assets. Since
it is convertible ,for more assets when the income beneficiary's interest has terminated than
at its beginning, it certainly appears to have appreciated in value, and this appreciation, when
realized by sale, should be taxable.
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This is all very persuasive, but most decisions have
disallowed the deduction
17
16
contended for. It has been approved by one dictum, one dissenting opinion,
8
and one concurring opinion.1 The strongest argument offered against allowing
the deduction and in favor of Irwin v. Gavit is the fact that the beneficiary, who
is taxed, has received assets which undeniably are wholly income, and on which
someone ought to be taxed. However, if the majority decisions are to be sustained, there should be some principle by which the apparent self-contradiction of
the Illinois Merchants Trust Co. case might be explained, and the hypothetical
cases postulated above might be decided consistently with the decision in Irwin
v. Gavit.
Before attempting to solve the problem thus presented, there must be considered another difficulty arising from an attempted application of Irwin v. Gazvit.
A beneficiary under a testamentary trust was entitled to receive an annuity-i. e.,
a specific sum each year-instead of simply the income of the estate. If there
should be no income in a particular year, the sum was to be paid from capital.
The Government contended that under Irwin. v. Gavit so much of each payment
as came from income should be taxable to the beneficiary. The Supreme Court
held, however, that none was taxable to him, on the ground that the decedent
intended the annuity to be a charge on the entire estate--capital, as well as
income.'
None of the cases explain satisfactorily why it should follow from
the premise that the payments are a charge20on the entire estate that the recipient
is taxable for no part of what he receives.
Unsatisfactory as is the reasoning of the Court, it perhaps offers a clue to
the solution of the problems growing out of Irwin v. Gavit. Essentially, the
problem is which of two beneficiaries-the income-beneficiary or the remainderman-should bear the burden of a tax on what is undeniably income."' For this
solution, it would seem to be both fair and logical to look to the intent of the
settlor who has created the interests of both beneficiaries.
Where a beneficiary is to receive "income" and not an "annuity" the settlor
has expressed an intent that the corpus should remain intact for the remainderman. If the trustee should pay the tax, it would necessarily be paid from the
corpus, since the beneficiary receives all the income. The corpus would thus be
diminished each year, and might even be exhausted by the time the income beneficiary's interest terminates, a result squarely contrary to the intent expressed
by the settlor, i. e., that the remainderman should receive the corpus of the
trust intact. Of course, the trustee might pay the tax out of income and pay only
the balance of the income to the beneficiary; but this would be substantially the
same as though the beneficiary had paid. The issue involved here is not how the
tax should be paid, but who should pay it. To enforce the settlor's intent, therefore, the tax must be paid by someone other than the trustee, and this means
that the burden falls on the recipient who receives the income.
In the "annuity" case, on the other hand, the settlor's intent is that the
annual payment may come from the corpus, if necessary. Here, if the trustee
"Dobbins v. Commissioner, supra note ii.
1

Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra note ii.
Appeal of McConnell, supranote Ii.
'Burnet v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148, 51 Sup. Ct. 374 (1931). Other cases to the same
effect are: McDonald v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 163 (1927); Kent v. Commissioner, 26
B. T. A. 482 (1932).
' Indeed, the inadequacy of the reasons given for the decisions is strongly suggested by
a dissenting opinion in Helvering v. Pardee, 54 Sup. Ct. 221, 223 (1933).
Of course, the tax might fall on other persons, should there be others interested in the
estate. To present the issue most clearly, there has been considered the simplest type of
case in which there are but two parties interested--i. e., an income beneficiary or an annuitant,
and a remainderman who is to receive the corpus when the income or annuity interest terminates.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

should pay the tax, and if it should come from the corpus,2 2 it would at least be
consistent with this intent. But it might be equally consistent with the settlor's
intent that the recipient of the annuity should pay the tax on that part which is
income. It is apparent, therefore, that looking to the intent of the settlor there
still remain two possible conclusions, while applying the same test in the "income"
case but one was possible. In striking parallel, whether coincidentally or otherwise, the Supreme Court united in holding that the estate is not taxable in an
"income" case, " 3 but divided on the question in the "annuity" case. 24 Is the intent
of the settlor the real and decisive factor which the Court, without expressly
saying so, applies in reaching its results ?
Equipped with the suggestion that the problem of Irwin v. Gavit is essentially to determine which of two possible taxpayers should pay the tax on given
income, and that the solution should hinge upon the intent of the interested parties, it will be profitable to return to the hypothetical cases suggested above.
First, may be considered the case in which the beneficiary of the income sold his
right to income to the trustee and purchased with the proceeds an insuranceannuity. What he actually . eceived in payment from the trustee was part of the
corpus. 25 Thenceforth, the income of this portion of capital would, of course, be
taxable to him, while the remainderman (or the trustee for his use) would be
taxable for the income on the rest of the corpus.26 If the remainderman should
allow the income on his part of the corpus to accumulate until the time when the
income beneficiary's interest would have terminated, had he not sold it, it would,
added to the corpus, amount to the original value of the estate.2 7 He would thus,
in the long run, have no more than he would have had, had he not bought the
beneficiary's interest, yet he would have had to pay income tax. Part of the tax
burden which was to have been upon the income beneficiary has been shifted to
him. 28 It is contended that, for this reason, it should likewise rest upon him
even where the original status remains unchanged. This assumes that the change
in status is immaterial, whereas it might be most important. By agreeing to buy,
the remainderman has agreed to become sole owner of so much of the corpus
as remained, and so to assume all the incidents usual to ownership. One of these
is the duty to pay a tax on income earned by the capital owned. Prior to the
change in their status, the rights of the parties had been established by the set'Of course, it will not come from the corpus if the income in a given year should be
sufficient to pay the income tax on the annual installment as well as the installment itself.
Helvering v. Butterworth, 54 Sup. Ct. 221 (1933).
Helvering v. Pardee, supra note 20.
' Assuming that this transaction takes place at the commencement of the income beneficiary's interest, it must be paid from the corpus, for there is, as yet, no earned income upon
which to draw. Even if it took place at a later date, and there were earned income, the income would accrue to the credit of the remainderman in the guise of the reduced value of
the income beneficiary's interest, so that the price of the remaining interest would have to
be paid from the corpus.
I Each party would be the absolute owner of his respective portion of the capital, unhampered by any outstanding interests, and so would fall under the ordinary rule that the owner
of capital is the owner of its income, and is taxable for it.
This must be so, because the price paid for the surrender of the right to income is calculated to be that sum which, with its income, would exactly equal the income which the
income beneficiary was to have received: this sum has been removed from the corpus. Since
the entire corpus plus all its income would have produced both the remainderman's and the
income beneficiary's interests, the removal of so much of it as would, with its income, produce the latter's interest should leave just enough to produce, with its income, the remainderman's interest.
0 The income on which the remainderman would here be taxable is but the increase in
the value of his interest, for which he was not held to be taxable, so long as the income beneficiary's interest continued to remain outstanding. The only difference is that he now has
a right to the use and enjoyment of the increment and the capital, whereo before, his right
was only to have capital conserved for him until his right to use and enjoy it should mature.
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tlor's intent; but now, by abandoning that status voluntarily and by setting up
a new one, their own intent supplants that of the settlor. Their wishes become
the material and decisive factor in deciding who should pay the tax; and their
intent that the remainderman should assume part of the burden should consequently govern.
There remains the case in which the beneficiary sold his right to receive income to a stranger and purchased an annuity with the proceeds. Since the erstwhile beneficiary would now be taxable for only so much of the annuity as
exceeds his purchase price, his tax burden is prinu facie lightened. But who
should pay the tax on the income of the estate which is now payable to the
stranger-purchaser? It would seem that the purchaser for value should not:
what he receives is not net income as to him.2 9 Yet the assets which he receives
consist wholly of the income of the trust corpus, on which someone must pay
a tax. In this respect they differ from annual payments under an insurance
annuity, each of which consists in part of the capital invested. The trustee
should not be taxed because, as has been pointed out, it was not the settlor's
intent to place the income tax burden upon the remainderman or the estate; and
to tax the trustee now would cause the burden to shift from the original beneficiary to the remainderman without the latter's consent.
Can the income beneficiary be taxed? It must be admitted that he has never
received any of the income on which the tax in question is to be levied. Loosely,
it might be said that he did receive it, in advance, when he was paid by the purchaser. The assets he then received were, however, capital; if they ever were
income, the tax had probably been paid on them when they were first earned. It
might be argued that they are income because they were received in exchange
for income. They were paid for, however, not with income, but with a right
to receive income; this right is in fact a bequest, and bequests are exempt from
taxation. The absurd conclusion is then, that capital, which normally is not
taxable, becomes taxable as income because it has been received in exchange for
a bequest which is itself not taxable as income.
Who, then, is to be taxed? If we eliminate the trustee on the ground that
the remainderman cannot be burdened further than the settlor intended him to be,
it becomes a question whether the beneficiary or the purchaser should be taxed.
Again this is fundamentally a question of the intent of the parties. If they had
agreed at the time of the sale that the purchaser should be responsible for income taxes, and if allowance for this had been made in the price paid, no one
would hesitate to place the burden on him, for he is the one who has the irrevocable right to receive the income, and who does in fact receive it. In the absence
of express stipulation, however, the reasonable inference would appear to be
that this was not the intent. The ordinary purchaser would certainly be unfamiliar with the intricacies of the problem as here discussed; to him, what he was
purchasing would be no different in substance and effect than a purchased annuity.30 He would, therefore, not expect to pay any income tax until he had
received an amount equal to his investment. The beneficiary, on the other hand,

0 Of course, the purchaser may be taxed for so much of the income he receives as exceeds the price paid by him, while the original beneficiary will be taxed for any income earned
by the assets received by him from the purchaser. Together these tax payments might equal
the total tax to be paid on the income of the trust estate. However, this would still leave
untaxed some taxable income. When the original beneficiary sells to a purchaser, the assets
he receives in payment are capital which he puts to work. There is then more capital at
work than before, and more taxable income is consequently produced.
* If members of the Board of Tax Appeals, skilled in analyzing tax problems, could find
no substantial distinction between an insurance annuity and a right to receive income (Appeal of McConnell, concurring opinion, supra note II), it would be highly unrealistic to expect the ordinary purchaser to be aware of this distinction.
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who was subject to the tax in the first place, could not expect to divest himself
of the burden without express stipulation to that effect. Opinions may differ,
of course, as to the intent in the case just described. However, whether we hold
the beneficiary or the purchaser taxable, the contention that the beneficiary who
has not sold out should be allowed to deduct for his "wasting capital" and thus
shift part of the tax burden to the remainderman must fail, for even where he
has sold out, the estate would not be taxable.
Looking to the intent of the parties as a test, the decision in the case in
which the donor to charity reserved to himself the income for life "- appears to
be more rational. The value of the donee's interest in the donation is reducible
by the value of the donor's life interest; but it does not follow that part of the
corpus is in fact invested for his exclusive benefit, yielding annual payments
which consist partly of income and partly of corpus. The contention was, however, that such is the case in substance and effect and that the court admitted
this by reducing the value of the donation by the value of the life interest. It
is true that the effects are the same in all respects except as to the burden of paying income tax. It does not follow that the effect should be the same here:
this is the very question to be decided. The decision must turn on intent-in
this case, the intent of the donor and donee. Reserving to himself the income
for life, the donor intended to have no part of the corpus. If he should deduct
part of the income received by him on the ground that it is capital as to him,
the courts would not allow the income so deducted to remain untaxed, since the
fact is that the payments received by him consist wholly of taxable income in
the sense that they are the product of capital on which no one has as yet paid an
income tax. The tax would, therefore, necessarily fall on the donee. A tax paid
by the donee, however, would have to be paid from the corpus, because all the
income is to go to the donor. The donor would thereby retain the benefit of part
of the corpus, which is contrary to the original intent. True, if he should surrender his right in exchange for enough capital to purchase an annuity equal to his
life interest, he could thereby shift part of the tax burden to the donee; but he
cannot do this without the donee's consent; and by that consent, the donee would
have assented to assuming the tax burden.
There remains to be discussed one other situation involving an application
of Irwin v. Gavit. A decedent may leave his estate in trust, with the provision
that his widov shall receive the income of the estate for life, in lieu of her dower
interest. Similarly, other cases involve trusts where in lieu of such interest the
widow is to receive an annuity. If she elects to take the benefit under the will,
the federal court held in Warner v. Walsh 3 that by giving up her dower interest
she becomes a purchaser for value of the benefit under the will, and on this
ground held that she was not taxable for any income until her receipts under the
will exceeded the value of the dower interest. 38 The question next arose whether
the trustee was taxable on behalf of the estate. Consistently with Warner v.
Walsh, the lower court held that inasmuch as the widow is not taxable, and since
what she receives is income which should be taxed to someone, the trustee must be
taxed. 34 In Helvering v. Butterworth,5 the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court, stating:
' Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Comm'r, supra note ii.
215 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
This case was followed by the federal courts in:
United States v. Bolster, 26 F. (2d) 76o (C. C. A. ist, 1928); Allen v. Brandeis, 29 F. (2d)
363 (C. C.A. 8th, 1928).
The rule formulated by the statute for insurance annuities was applied.
Butterworth v. Comm'r, 23 B. T. A. 838 (1931).
Supra note 23.
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"We cannot accept the reasoning advanced to support the three cases
just cited. 8 The evident general purpose of the statute was to tax in some
way the whole income of all trust estates. . . . But he [the trustee] was
entitled to credit for any sum paid to a beneficiary . . . 37 and this amount
then became taxable to the beneficiary.
"When she makes her election, the widow decides to accept the benefits
of the will with the accompanying rights and liabilities. In no sense does she
purchase an annuity." 38
It becomes apparent that the widow is a "purchaser for value" of a right
to receive income, if not of an annuity, when we reflect that she had the right
to assume complete ownership of part of the estate,3 9 and to purchase with it an
annuity. If she had taken the dower interest, she could have sold it and purchased the right to the income of the estate itself. No one would question that
either of these transactions would be a bona fide purchase. If instead of going
through the motions of taking her dower interest, selling it, and then purchasing
the right to income, she merely surrenders her dower right in exchange for the
right to income, she should not be any the less a purchaser. Knowing that she
is a purchaser, however, does not necessarily solve the problem. If this were
the solution, the United States Supreme Court would not have rejected the
reasoning of Warner v. Walsh without explaining why the widow, a purchaser
for value, should not be allowed to deduct the price paid for her purchase. The
conclusion is irresistible that other considerations, unexpressed, determined the
result.
Exactly what is the status of the widow in this case? It is quite apparent
that she is unlike the purchaser of an insurance annuity in one very important
respect. The latter, as we have seen, receives back his capital, as well as his
income. Although he deducts the capital, all the income which he receives is
tax-paid by him, and the government is satisfied. The widow, who receives the
income of the estate receives payments of which no part is capital, in the sense
that it has not yet been subjected to an income tax. If she should be allowed
to deduct her purchase price, the burden of the tax not paid by her would fall
on the estate. Once more the issue becomes which of two parties should be
taxed.
Again, the intent of the parties appears to be the basic, though hidden,
factor in the solution. Under the terms of the will, the settlor has indicated
as his intent that the widow, should she elect to take under the will, should
have the income only and no part of the corpus. If she should be allowed to
deduct the value of her dower interest, the estate would be obliged to pay the
tax on the portion she deducted, contrary to the settlor's intent that the corpus
should remain intact. The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the tax
should fall on the widow.
On the other hand, where the widow is to receive an annuity, rather than
income, it is not necessarily contrary to the intent of the parties that the estate
should pay part of the income tax. Since it was c6ntemplated that the annual payment might come from capital, should the income be insufficient, the income
tax, too, might consistently with the testator's intent, come from capital and the
Warner v. Walsh; United States v. Bolster; Allen v. Brandeis, all supra note 32.
Under the statute, which provides that a trustee shall be entitled to deduct any sums
paid by him to beneficiaries of the trust: 44 STAT. 32 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 96o (1927).
"IHelvering v. Butterworth, supra note 23, at 222; cf. People v. Lynch, 255 N. Y. 323,
174 N. E. 696 (i931) (in which the same result was reached on a different theory, not referred to in the Butterworth case).
I This right, created by statute, is not denied by any of the cases: Helvering v. Butterworth, supra note 23; Warner v. Walsh, supra note 32; People v. Lynch, supra note 38.
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court might, therefore, hold that the widow is not taxable in this case and at
the same time hold that where she has a right to "income" she is taxable.
The most striking characteristic of the case material surrounding the problem of Irwin v. Gazit is a failure to recognize the true issue. One finds a series
of apparently conflicting rules, 40 satisfactory reasons for which are not stated.
Nowhere can there be found a standard by which the validity of these rules
may be tested, or the decisions reconciled. Something is needed to weld rules
and decisions into an organic body of law. It is quite obvious from the foregoing discussion that no test suggested in cases uncomplicated by any separation of the ownership of income from the ownership of capital can successfully
explain the decisions or solve the problems encountered when such a separation
has taken place. In this type of case, the fundamental question is not "who
owns the income?" but "who should be taxed?" The answer to the latter
question should depend, in the first instance, upon the intent of the person who
separated the capital from the income and, in the next, upon the intention expressed by the interested parties, should they change the status quo by a subsequent contract. It is especially significant that the test of the intent of the
parties justifies and reconciles all of the now prevailing decisions of the Supreme Court. 41 This suggests strongly that the Court, although it has not
expressly formulated any such principle, has been tacitly applying it in arriving at its decisions.
A. I. C.
• Thus, Irwin v. Gavit, supra note i, holds that the beneficiary of income is taxable for
all the income he receives, while Burnet v. Whitehouse, supra note 1g, holds that the recipient
of an annuity, which may come entirely from income, and to which he has an irrevocable
right, is not taxable; Warner v. Walsh, supra note 32, holds that a widow who takes a right
to income under a will in lieu of dower is not taxable, because she is a purchaser for value,
while Helvering v. Butterworth, supra note 23, holds that she is taxable simply because
someone must be taxed, and, in the opinion of the Court, the trustee is not taxable.
' (i) That the beneficiary of income of a trust fund is properly taxable for all the income he receives, and should not be allowed to deduct as "capital" the present value of his
right to receive income, in accord with Irwin v. Gavit, supra note 1; (2) that the beneficiary
of an annuity, payable from a trust estate, is not taxable for any part of what he receives,
even though it may have come from income, in accord with Burnet v. Whitehouse, supra
note I9; (3) that the donor of property, who reserved a right to its income for life, can be
denied both the right to deduct the face value of the property donated, and the present value
of his life interest, in accord with the Board of Tax Appeals decision in Illinois Merchants
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, supra note II; and (4) that the widow who takes a right to income,
giving up her dower right, is a purchaser for value, yet is taxable for all that she receives,
and may not deduct the value of her dower interest, in accord with Helvering v. Butterworth, supra note 23.

